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Abstract
The authors (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, Review of Economic Studies, 2014) claimed that control
treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or
no cycles. After correcting two mathematical mistakes in their cycles tripwire algorithm, we study the
cycles by scanning the tripwire in the full strategy space of the games and we find significant cycles that
were omitted by the authors. So we suggest that all of the treatments exhibit significant cycles.
JEL numbers: C72, C73, C92, D83;
Keywords: experiments, learning, cycles, mixed equilibrium, discrete time
The existence of cycles in mixed equilibrium games has been a cutting edge question in the field crossing
game theory [1] and evolutionary game theory [2] for decades. It is a milestone contribution of Cason,
Friedman and Hopkins [3] that they confirmed the existence of cycles by quantitative measurement in
control experiments, but we can hardly agree with one of their conclusions in their latest article.
In their article [3], they claimed that control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete
time) replicate previous results that exhibit “weak or no cycles”, which depended on the result ——
the stable discrete time treatments (SD) do not exhibit clear cyclical behavior indicated by CRI’s not
significantly different from 0 (see their Table 3).
Two mathematical mistakes in the measurement algorithm were found after we checked their result
above.1 Then we corrected the mistakes (see Appendix). Using the refined measurement, if the start
point (α, β) of the tripwire for counting cycles (see Fig. 1) was set at ( 14 ,
1
4 ) —— Nash equilibrim (NE)
of the games as [3], CRI of SD will still not be significantly different from 0 (see up panel in Table 1 and
compare it with their Table 3). So, for SD, we agree that there are only weak or no cycles around NE.
However, if we set (α, β) at (0.23, 0.26) for SD-Mixed and at (0.22, 0.40) for SD-Pure and use the CRI
measurement as criterion still,2 we can find that CRI of both SD-Mixed and SD-Pure are significantly
different from 0 , indicating that there are indeed cyclical behaviors (see low panel in Table 1).
Meanwhile, if we use the accumulated counting number of cycles C as the index (see the Eq.(2) in [4]
for detailed explanation) instead of CRI, we also find that all C¯ (of the experimental blocks) for the
treatments are significantly different from 0 (see Table 2). This, again, indicates the existence of cycles.
So, for SD, we doubt the validity of their conclusion that there are “weak or no cycle”. We suggest
that the treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) do exhibit significant cycles rather
than “weak or no cycles”.3
1We thank the authors’ [3] confirmation on this point during the ESA-NA (2014) Conference.
2 Our pilot results suggest that using angular motion of the transits (e.g. the θ in Eq.(10) in [4]) is an efficient way of
observing cycles too. We hope to return to this issue in a future study.
3We would like to point out the followings. (1) The start point (α, β) for the two SD games is close to the actual mean
observed value of the aggregated social strategy, which seems to tell us that cycles are actually around the mean observed
value instead of NE. (2) Their treatments of RPS games are economical since all they need are 6 groups of 8 subjects and a
period of time of 15 minutes. If cycle could be obtained, such treatments could be great exemplified classroom experiments
for teaching evolutionary game theory.
2Number of Number of Cycle
Game Condition (α, β) Counter-Clock Clockwise Rotation p-value
-wise Transits Transits Index (CRI)
S Continuous-Instant ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 25.2 5.5 0.65* 0.028
S Continuous-Slow ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 9.4 0.8 0.87* 0.027
S Discrete-Mixed (SD-Mixed) ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 2.3 1.2 0.38 0.116
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 1.0 1.0 0.13 0.753
Ua Continuous-Instant (
1
4
, 1
4
) 31.9 0.9 0.94* 0.027
Ua Continuous-Slow (
1
4
, 1
4
) 8.2 0.0 1.00* 0.014
Ua Discrete-Mixed (
1
4
, 1
4
) 2.3 0.2 0.79* 0.027
Ua Discrete-Pure (
1
4
, 1
4
) 1.9 0.3 0.79* 0.027
Ub Continuous-Slow (
1
4
, 1
4
) 0.3 8.5 -0.93* 0.028
S Discrete-Mixed (SD-Mixed) (0.23, 0.26) 2.3 1.1 0.41* 0.035
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) (0.22, 0.40) 4.1 3.3 0.14* 0.028
Table 1 Mean Transits and CRI (Update Table 3 in [3] with Refined Measurement).
*Denotes CRI Index is significantly (p-value < 5%) different from 0 according to 2-tailed Wilcoxon test.
Game Condition (α, β) B1
† B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 C¯ ‡ p-value
S Continuous-Instant ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 128 53 120 74 58 157 98.3* 0.028
S Continuous-Slow ( 1
4
, 1
4
) 49 47 45 55 24 38 43.0* 0.028
S Discrete-Mixed (SD-Mixed) (0.23, 0.26) 3 0 3 2 9 18 5.8* 0.035
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) (0.22, 0.40) 6 4 2 4 8 1 4.2* 0.027
Ua Continuous-Instant (
1
4
, 1
4
) 158 114 218 195 175 70 155.0* 0.028
Ua Continuous-Slow (
1
4
, 1
4
) 45 53 48 39 28 34 41.2* 0.028
Ua Discrete-Mixed (
1
4
, 1
4
) 9 16 10 6 6 17 10.7* 0.027
Ua Discrete-Pure (
1
4
, 1
4
) 5 11.5 1.5 13 5.5 11 7.9* 0.028
Ua Discrete-Pure (
1
4
, 1
4
) -52 -29 -43 -49 -40 -33 -41.0* 0.028
Table 2: The accumulated counting number of cycles (C) in each block. † B indicates block, number
1 ∼ 6 indicates the block number in related treatment. ‡ C¯ indicates the mean accumulated counting number of
cycles of an experimental block. *Denotes C index is significantly (p-value < 5%) different from 0 according to
2-tailed Wilcoxon test.
3Appendix
CRI was defined as [3] CRI=CCT−CTCCT+CT , and CCT and CT can be interpreted as follows. Supposing the
Poincare section (“tripwire”) is the segment between Pc:≡(α, β) as shown in Fig. A1 (referring to the
Fig. 1 in [3]) and Pe=(α, 0), and a transit is a directional segment from state (x1, y1) observed at t to
state (x2, y2) at (t+ 1). These two segments could cross at X as
X :≡ (Xx, Xy) =
(
α, y1 +
(y2 − y1)(α− x1)
x2 − x1
)
. (1)
Accordingly, CCT =
∑
Ct>0
Ct and CT =
∑
Ct<0
|Ct| in which Ct value of the transit (at time t) should
be4
Condition 1 Ct = 0 if X 6∈ (Pc, Pe] ∪ x2 = x1
Condition 2 Ct = 1 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 > α > x1
Ct = −1 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 < α < x1
Condition 3 Ct =
1
2 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 > x1 ∩ (x1 = α ∪ x2 = α)
Ct = − 12 if X ∈ (Pc, Pe] ∩ x2 < x1 ∩ (x1 = α ∪ x2 = α)
At the same time, the accumulated counting number of cycles is C:=
∑
Ct (exactly the same as Eq.(2)
in [4]). According to [4], when C serves as an index, the criterion for testing the existence of cycles is
that: if C is significantly different from 0, then there are cycles; otherwise, no cycles.
There are two mathematical mistakes in the measurement algorithm (see Result 3.do in their paper’s
supplement). Mistake-1: For Condition 2, a necessary condition for Ct = ±1 was wrongly set as y1+y22 <
β. Mistake-2: For Condition 3, Ct was wrongly set as 0.
Algorithm Index Mean
Game Condition (α, β) refined chosed Index p-value
(before/after) CRI/C value
S Discrete-Pure (SD-Pure) (0.22, 0.40) before CRI 0.07 0.173
(0.22, 0.40) before C 2.17 0.113
(0.22, 0.40) after CRI 0.14* 0.028
(0.22, 0.40) after C 4.20* 0.027
Table A1: Explanation for Necessity of Correction for the Measurement Algorithm.
*Denotes CRI Index is significantly (p-value < 5%) different from 0 according to 2-tailed Wilcoxon test.
These mistakes need to be corrected. Table A1 exhibits both results, algorithm not refined and refined.
Obviously, without refined algorithm we cannot find cycles even if we set (α, β) at (0.22, 0.40). On the
contrary, with the refined algorithm, the existence of cycles can be verified by both CRI and C. This
comparison implies that the algorithm correction is necessary.
Programs for the replication of the results in this paper are provided in supplements.
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Figure A1: Illustration of the tripwire for counting cycles (Poincare section) [3]. A tripwire for
counting cycles is a segment constructed between the reference point (α, β) and the simplex edge, as the vertical
dashed line extending below the point (α, β). The reference point of the right tripwire should be at (α, β)=(0.82,
0.10), while the authors [3] set it at (α, β) = ( 1
4
, 1
4
) (the Nash equilibrium), the reference point of the tripwire in
the middle, and thus discovering weak or no cycles for stable discrete time treatments (SD). The arrow indicates
a transit from (x1, y1) to (x2, y2), crossing the tripwire from the left side.
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